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II. IMS -THE FUTURE FIXED-MOBILE CONVERGENCE
3GPP Release 5 [3] defines IP Multimedia Systems [1] specifications architecture on top of packet switched core network (PSCN) for the provision of real time multimedia services. The IMS provides easy and efficient ways to integrate different services, even from third parties and enables the seamless integration of legacy services and is designed for consistent interactions with circuit switched domains. The IMS manages event oriented quality of service policies e.g. use of VoIP and HTTP in a single session: VoIP has QoS, HTTP is best effort. This makes IMS as the future technology for next generation service delivery platform. The IMS is based on the principles and protocols of the Internet defined by the IETF, which have been adapted for their use within a secure, scalable carrier grade environment. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [6] is used as the standard signaling protocol that establishes controls, modifies and terminates voice, video and messaging sessions between two or more participants. The Call State Control Functions (CSCF) server implements and manages the SIP functionalities. The Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) related functionality provision within the IMS is based on the Diameter protocol [7] and is implemented in the Home Subscriber Server (HSS). Media Gateways and Media Server support potentially required adaptation of multimedia information for specific QoS requirements. IMS layered architecture consists of three planes i.e. the user, control, and application planes [1] .
A. IMS Components and Entities
IMS consists of different entities with well-defined functions [8] . Between each of these entities the standards define a reference point, which describes the functionalities and the used protocol. The important components of IMS (shown in figure 1) are: P-CSCF (Proxy Call State Control Function):-It behaves like a proxy accepting requests and services. Its functionality includes authorize the bearer resources for the appropriate QoS level, emergency calls, monitoring, header (de)compression and identification of I-CSCF. I-CSCF (Interrogating Call State Control Function):-Its functionality includes assigning an S-CSCF to a user performing SIP registration/charging and resource utilisation: generation of Charging Data Records (CDRs)/acting as a Topology Hiding Inter-working Gateway (THIG). S-CSCF (Serving Call State Control Function):-It performs session control services for the endpoint and maintains session state as needed by the network operator for the support of services. Its functionality includes user registration/interaction with services platforms for the support of Services. MRF (Media Resource Function):-It provides media stream processing like mixing, announcements, analysis and transcoding. HSS (Home Subscriber Server):-It is the master database of an IMS that stores user's profiles including individual filtering information, user status information and application server profiles. AS (Application Server):-It provides service platform in IMS environment. It supports well defined signaling and administration interfaces (ISC & Sh), and SIP and Diameter protocols. The SIP AS comprises filter rules to decide which of the applications deployed on the server should be selected for handling the session.
B. IMS Reference Points and Interfaces
To connect different IMS entities with each other and carrying signal and information, interfaces and reference points are defined by 3GPP. We will discuss only those interfaces where information is necessary to be protected. Gm:-It connects UE to IMS Core Network. It is used to transport all SIP signalling messages between UE and P-CSCF. Cx:-It is between HSS and CSCF. The centralized data is utilized by I-CSCF and S-CSCF when user registers or receives sessions using Cx reference point and the selected protocol is Diameter. ISC:-The IMS Service Control interface is between the S-CSCF and the application server. The AS could behave as SIP UA or SIP Proxy on this interface. Sh:-It connects the AS with the HSS and the used protocol is Diameter. It enables the AS to obtain user data or to get to know the S-CSCF to send SIP request. Ut Interface:-It is between the user and the AS. HTTP is the chosen data protocol.
III. NETWORK DOMAIN SECURITY (NDS) ARCHITECTURE
Network domain is a network controlled by single operator or administrator authority to implement uniform security policy within the domain. Hence, the level of security and the available security services are same within security domain. The domain security is applied on the border of operator's network and protected by Security Gateways (SEGs) [2] . NDS/IP is used to protect operators IMS core network and the traffic between visited and home networks. The fundamental idea of the NDS/IP architecture is to provide hop-by-hop security which helps to maintain separate security policies internally and towards other external security domains [9] . In NDS/IP, Security Gateways maintain IPSec secure ESP (Encapsulated Security Payload) Security Associations in tunnel mode between security domains. All NDS/IP traffic from network entities of security domain is routed via SEG to other security domain using hop-by-hop security protection to the end destination. Different entities and interfaces of network domain security architecture are given below:
A. NDS Interfaces
The interfaces between security domains are represented as Za while the interfaces within the security domain are represented as Zb as shown in figure 2. Zainterface covers all NDS/IP traffic between security domains. For Za-interface, authentication and data integrity protection is required and data encryption is recommended. These three security features are implemented by using ESP (Encapsulated Security Payload) protocol [10] . SEGs use IKE (Internet Key Exchange) to negotiate, establish and maintain secure ESP tunnel for forwarding NDS/IP traffic between security domains. The security policy over Za-interface depends upon the roaming agreement. For Zb-interface, authentication and data integrity protection is required and implemented by using ESP protocol. Data encryption is optional and depends upon the decision of security domain operator.
B. Security Gateways (SEGs)
Security Gateways are network entities on the borders of IP security domains, providing security to IP based protocols and establish the communication over Zainterface. All NDS/IP traffic passes through SEG before entering or leaving the security domain. A security domain can have more than one SEG depending upon destinations, avoid single point failure or traffic load balancing. Each SEG is defined to handle NDS/IP traffic by well-defined rules to reach IP security domain [11] . When protecting inter-domain IMS traffic it is mandatory to provide confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication in the NDS/IP The security gateways enforce the security policies between networks. The security may include filtering policies as well as firewall functionality. SEGs are responsible for security sensitive operations and need to be physically secured. The SEG will normally provide at least one IPSec tunnel at all times to a particular peer SEG. Each SEG is responsible for setting up and maintaining IPSec security associations (SAs) [12] with its peer SEGs. These SAs are negotiated using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [13] protocol. Each SEG maintains two SAs per connection: one for inbound traffic and other for outbound traffic. In addition, it maintains a single Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) SA [14] for key management. In NDS/IP, authentication is based on preshared secrets. The architecture for SEGs is presented in figure 3 . The SEG will maintain logically separate Security Associations Database and Security Policy Database for each interface [2] . Their functionalities are given as:
1) Security Policy Database (SPD)
It contains the policies by which all inbound and outbound traffic is categorized by security gateways. In general, packets are selected for one of three processing modes based on IP and transport layer header information matched against entries in the database (SPD). A packet is either afforded IPSec security services, discarded, or allowed to bypass IPSec.
2) Security Associations Database (SAD)
It is a container for all active SAs, and related parameters. A set of selectors is used by the SPD to map traffic to a specific SA. This relationship is represented by a set of information between the SEGs. The information must be agreed upon and shared between all the SEGs. When accessing SA attributes, SEGs use a pointer or identifier referred as the Security Parameter Index (SPI) [2] .
IV. USE OF IPSEC IN NDS/IP ENVIRONMENT
IPSec provides set of features that are used by NDS/IP to get security services including data integrity, data origin authentication, anti-replay protection and limited protection against traffic flow analysis and confidentiality. IPSec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select the required security protocols, determine the algorithms to be used and to provide the cryptographic keys. It can be used to protect one or more links between a pair of SEGs, or between a SEG and a host. The components of the IPSec security architecture are given:
A. Security Protocols
The IPSec uses two protocols to provide traffic security i.e. Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). These protocols may be applied alone or in combination with each other to provide a desired set of security services. Each protocol supports two modes of use i.e. transport and tunnel. In transport mode the protocols provide protection primarily for upper layer protocols. Tunnel mode is typically used to tunnel IP traffic between two SEGs. The difference is that in transport mode IPSec offers limited protection to IP headers, whereas in tunnel mode the full IP datagram is protected [11] . The security protocol used in NDS/IP for encryption, data integrity protection and authentication is IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [10] in tunnel mode i.e. the full IP datagram, including the IP header, is encapsulated in the ESP packet. The set of services provided depends on options selected at the time of security association establishment and on the placement of the implementation. The anti-replay service may be selected only if data origin authentication is selected, and its selection is solely at the discretion of the receiver [15] .
AH and ESP protocols in tunnel mode are explained in figure 4 . The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header is designed to provide a mix of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. The ESP header is inserted before an encapsulated IP header in tunnel mode. The tunnel mode ESP is employed by the SEGs to protect transit traffic. The inner IP header carries the ultimate source and destination addresses, while an outer IP header may contain distinct IP addresses usually addresses of security gateways. In tunnel mode, ESP protects the entire inner IP packet, including the entire inner IP header [15] . If authentication is selected, encryption is performed first, before the authentication, and the encryption does not encompass the Authentication Data field. This order of processing facilitates rapid detection and rejection of replayed or counterfeit packets by the receiver, prior to decrypting the packet, hence potentially reducing the impact of denial of service attacks. It also allows for the possibility of parallel processing of packets at the receiver, hence decryption can take place in parallel with authentication.
B. Security Associations
A security association (SA) is a set of policy and key(s) used to protect information and is defined as the relationship between two SEGs that allows the protection of information communicated between them and that defines how they are going to use security services to secure their communications. It includes information on authentication and/or encryption algorithms, cryptographic keys and key lengths as well as the initialization vectors (IV) that are shared between the entities. A SA is unidirectional; so typically two SAs are needed for a bidirectional flow of traffic: one for inbound (read) traffic and other for outbound (write) traffic. Security protocols make use of security associations (SAs) as they provide security services. This relationship includes a shared symmetric key and security attributes describing the relationship. It is uniquely identified by security parameter index (SPI) and destination IP address [10] .
C. Key Management
The process for the distribution of cryptographic keys to be used with the security protocols is called key management. In IMS/UMTS network domain security architecture, the key distribution between SEGs is handled by IKE protocol [14] . The main purpose of IKE is to negotiate, establish and maintain Security Associations between network entities that are used to establish secure communications. The IKE automatically negotiates IPSec security associations (SAs) and enables IPSec secure communications [13] . There are two basic methods used to establish authenticated key exchange i.e. Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Each mode generates authenticated keying material from an ephemeral DiffieHellman exchange. In addition, Quick Mode must be implemented as a mechanism to generate fresh keying material and negotiate non-ISAKMP security services and New Group Mode should be implemented as a mechanism to define private groups for Diffie-Hellman exchanges [16] . The IKE protocol is used for negotiation of IPsec SAs with the following additional requirements for inter-security domain SA negotiations over Zainterface [2] .
1) IKE phase-1 (ISAKMP SA):
• The use of pre-shared secrets for authentication will be supported.
• Only ISAKMP Main Mode will be used.
• IP addresses and Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) shall be supported for identification.
• Support of 3DES in CBC mode [17] shall be mandatory for confidentiality. 
B. ESP Protocol in Tunnel Mode

Figure 4. AH and ESP Protocols in Tunnel Mode
• Support of AES in CBC mode [18] shall be mandatory for confidentiality.
• Support of SHA-1 [19] shall be mandatory for integrity/message authentication.
• Support of Diffie-Hellman group 2 shall be mandatory for Diffie-Hellman exchange [20] . Phase-1 IKE SAs will be persistent with respect to the IPsec SAs i.e. IKE SAs will have a lifetime for at least the same duration, as does the derived IPsec SAs. The IPsec SAs should be re-keyed proactively, i.e. a new SA should be established before the old SA expires [2] .
2) IKE phase-2 (IPsec SA):
• Perfect Forward Secrecy is optional;
• Only IP addresses or subnet identity types shall be mandatory address types; • Support of Notifications shall be mandatory;
• Support of Diffie-Hellman group 2 shall be mandatory for Diffie-Hellman exchange.
D. Encryption and Authentication Algorithms
To implement IMS inter-domain security, 3GPP recommends for encryption, Triple DES (3DES) [17] algorithm is mandatory, while for data integrity and authentication both MD5 [21] and SHA-1 [19] can be used. IPsec offers set of confidentiality transforms supports including ESP_NULL and ESP_DES transforms. However, Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is no longer considered sufficiently strong in terms of cryptographic strength. It is mentioned by IESG in RFC 2407 [22] that the ESP_DES transform is likely to be deprecated in the near future. It is therefore explicitly recommended in NDS/IP that ESP_3DES algorithm is mandatory instead of ESP_DES. Also the support for AES-CBC cipher algorithm [18] is mandatory with key length of 128 bits. IPSec offers data integrity transforms that compliant IPsec implementation is required to support are the ESP_NULL, the ESP_HMAC_MD5 and the ESP_HMAC_SHA-1 transforms. For NDS/IP traffic ESP will always be used to provide integrity, data origin authentication, and antireplay services, thus the ESP_NULL authentication algorithm is explicitly not allowed for use. ESP shall support ESP_HMAC_SHA-1 algorithm in NDS/IP.
V. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI)
Public key cryptography utilizes a pair of keys: private and public. Information is encrypted with the public key, and decrypted with the corresponding private key [20] . Digital signatures can be achieved by reversing the order of keys. They can be appended to messages to provide proof of authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. The PKI Forum has provided Technical Perspective [23] to use PKI technology in specific vendor environment by addressing security policies and procedures [16] . PKI is based on digital certificates that bind the user's digital signature with his public key. PKI consists of following components:
A. Security Policy A security policy defines the top-level direction on information security, as well as the processes and principles for the use of cryptography. Typically it will include statements on how to handle keys and valuable information, and will set the level of control required to match the levels of risk.
B. Certification Authority (CA)
The CA issues certificates by binding the identity of a user or SEG to a public key with a digital signature and schedules expiry dates for certificates. It ensures publishing Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to revoke certificates when necessary. The PKI must ensure that CA's private key is held in a tamper-resistant security module, and provision must be made for back-up copies for disaster recovery purposes. Access to CA should be tightly controlled. All certificate requests should be digitally signed to detect and prevent hackers from deliberately generating counterfeit certificates. All significant events performed by the CA system should be recorded in a secure audit trail to ensure that entries cannot be falsified. The trust relationship between two authorities is establishes by cross-certification. When CA A is cross-certified with CA B, this implies that A has chosen to trust certificates issued by B. The crosscertification process enables the users under both authorities to trust the other authority's certificates. Trust in this context equals being able to authenticate. There are two types of cross-certification processes:
1) Manual Cross-certification
In manual cross-certification, mutual crosscertifications are established directly between the Certification Authorities. The authority makes decisions about trust locally. When a CA A chooses to trust a CA B, then authority A signs the certificate of the authority B and vice versa, and distributes the new certificate locally. The disadvantage of this approach is that it often results in scenarios where there need to be a large number of certificates available for the entities doing the trust decisions: There needs to be a certificate signed by the local Certification Authority for each security domain with which the local authority wishes to trust. However, all the certificates can be configured locally and are locally signed, so their management is often flexible.
2) Brideg Cross-certification
The Bridge CA is a concept that reduces the number of certificates that need to be configured for the entity that does the certificate checking. When two authorities are mutually cross-certified with the bridge, the authorities do not need to know about each other. Authorities can still trust each other because the trust in this model is transitive i.e. A trusts bridge, bridge trusts B, thus A trusts B and vice versa. The bridge CA acts like a bridge between the authorities and the two authorities will also trust that the bridge CA is trusted and secure. Bridge CA style cross-certifications are useful in scenarios where all entities communicate a common Trusted Third Party. If an authority needs to restrict the trust or access control derived from the Bridge CA, it additionally needs to implement those restrictions [4] .
VI. PKI BASED NDS AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK
This section explain the implementation of PKI based Network Domain Security/Authentication Framework which uses a simple access control method, i.e. each element that is authenticated also provides a service. The architecture uses direct cross-certifications between the security domains, which enables easy policy configurations in the SEGs. Each security domain has at least one Local Certificate Authority (LCA) and one Domain Certificate Authority (DCA) as shown in figure  5 . Their functionalities are given as:
• The LCA of the domain issues certificates to the SEGs in the domain that have interconnection with SEGs in other domains.
• The DCA of the domain issues certificates to the LCAs of other domains with which the operator's SEGs have interconnection. All the certificates are based on the Internet X.509 certificate profile [24] . The LCA issues certificates for SEGs that implement the Za interface. When SEG of the security domain A establishes a secure connection with the SEG of the domain B, they are able to authenticate each other. The mutual authentication is checked using the certificates the LCAs issued for the SEGs. When a roaming agreement is established between the domains, the DCA cross-certify the LCA of the peer operator. The created cross-certificates need only to be configured locally to each domain.
The cross-certificates issue by DCA-A of security domain A for the LCA of security domain B, will be available for SEG of domain A which implements the Za interface towards domain B. Similarly, the crosscertificates issue by DCA-B of security domain B for the LCA of security domain A, will be available for SEG of domain B which implements the Za interface towards domain A. After cross-certification, the SEG-A is able to verify the following path (figure 6):
SEG-B LCA-B DCA-A Similarly, the SEG-B is able to verify the path: SEG-A LCA-A DCA-B If the verification process is satisfied than both domains A and B can trust each other and use the certificates for each others.
The public key of the DCA is stored securely in each SEG within the operator's domain. This allows the SEG to verify cross certificates issued by its operator's DCA. It is assumed that each operator domain could include 2 to 10 SEGs. An operator may decide to set up both LCA and DCA as a single CA, i.e. separation of CAs is not required. The NDS/AF is initially based on a simple trust model that avoids the introduction of transitive trust and/or additional authorisation information. The simple trust model implies manual cross-certification [4] . Now we discuss the design scenarios of NDS/AF.
A. Creating/Terminating Roaming Agreement
When a roaming agreement is required, the SEGs of two different domains establish the secure tunnel using cross-certificates issued by DCA of two domains. The creation of a roaming agreement only involves use of the private keys of the DCAs. There is no need for the operators to use the private keys of their respective LCAs in forming a roaming agreement. When creating the new cross-certificate, the DCA set the path length to zero to initiate the new cross-certificate to be used in signing new CA certificates. When the new cross-certificate is available to the SEG, its information are configured in the SEG. The authentication can be done based on the created crosscertificates. When a roaming agreement is terminated or due to an urgent service termination need, all concerned SEG peers will remove the IPsec SAs using devicespecific management methods. Each concerned operator will also list the cross-certificate created for the DCA of the terminated operator in his local Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [4] .
B. Creating VPN Tunnel
After establishing a roaming agreement and finishing the required certificate management operations, the operators configure their SEGs for SEG-SEG connection, and the SAs are established as specified by NDS/IP. In each connection configuration, the remote SEG DNS name or IP address is specified. Only the local DCA and LCA are configured as trusted CAs [4] . Because of the cross-certification, any operator who's LCA has been cross-certified can get access using this VPN connection configuration. Now we discuss the flow of connection negotiation as mentioned in [4] from SEG-A (initiator). The SEG-B (responder) will perform the same function.
• During connection initiation, the initiating SEG-A provides its own SEG certificate and the corresponding digital signature in IKE Main Mode message 3.
• SEG-A receives the remote SEG-B certificate and signature.
• SEG-A validates the remote SEG-B signature.
• SEG-A verifies the validity of SEG-B certificate by a CRL check to both the Operator A and Operator B CRL databases. If SEG cannot successfully perform both CRL checks, it assumes as an error and abort tunnel establishment.
• SEG-A validates SEG-B certificate using the cross-certificate for LCA-B by executing the following actions:
1. SEG-A verifies the validity of cross-certificate for LCA-B by a CRL check to the DCA-A CRL database. If a SEG cannot successfully perform the CRL check, it will assume as an error and abort tunnel establishment. 2. SEG-A validates the cross-certificate for LCA-B using its DCA certificate if DCA is not a toplevel CA, otherwise DCA public key is implicitly trusted. In this way, IKE Phase 1 SA is established and Phase-2 SA negotiation proceeds as described in NDS/IP with PSK authentication.
C. Certificate Profiles
Before fulfilling any signing certificate request, the LCA and DCA will make sure that the request meets the following certificates profiles criteria:
• Certificates of version 3 are in use according to RFC 3280 [25] ; • Support of SHA-1 has algorithm; • For DCA and LCA certificates, the RSA key length will be at least 2048-bits • For SEG certificate, the RSA key length will be at least 1024-bits
D. SEG Certificates Validation
During VPN tunnel establishment, each SEG has to verify the validity of its peer SEG certificate. SEG-A verify the validity of cross-certificate of LCA-B and certificate of SEG-B and it will be able to fetch the crosscertificate of LCA-B. SEG-B performs the same process for the validity of SEG-A certificates. At this point, the VPN tunnel is not yet available; therefore, the CRL of the peering LCA will be accessible for SEG without utilizing the Za-interface. Figure 6 shows the repositories in which local CR contains cross-certificates for LCA, the local CRL contains LCA cross-certificate revocation and the public CRL contains of SEG and LCA certificates and can be accessed by other domains.
